The aim of this paper is at analyzing from various points of view the relationships betwee bduction and deduction. In particular, we consider a meta-level definition of abduction in l d terms of deduction, similar to various definitions proposed in the literature, and an object-leve efinition in which abductive conclusions are expressed as a logical consequence of the obser-. T vations and of a simple transformation of the domain theory based on predicate completion he equivalence between the two definitions is proved for domain theories of considerable -s expressive power. The object-level characterization we propose uses very simple forms of rea oning and the equivalence result allows us to make explicit some of the assumptions underly- ore generally, given a domain theory T and a formula Ψ, an explanation for Ψ in T is a set s E of formulae such that (1) T ∪ E is consistent; (2) Ψ is a consequence of T ∪ E; (3) E has ome further properties that make it interesting (we shall return later to that).
u Deduction and abduction play a fundamental role in intelligent problem solving; in partic lar abduction seems to be a basic reasoning component in activities such as diagnosis [ [9, 10, 27, 31, 32] , plan formation [15] , story comprehension [5] , natural language interpretation 18 , 19], learning [11, 24] .
Such a wide interest has stimulated many researches toward formal accounts of abductive reab soning. Cox & Pietrzykowski [10] and Goebel et al. [17] provided (different) procedures ased on the resolution principle to compute explanations for a set of observations; de Kleer's [ ATMS [12] can be regarded as an abductive problem solver (as noticed also by Levesque 22] ); Pearl [25] pointed out the distinction between expectation evoking (deductive) and expla--t nation evoking (abductive) default rules; Poole [28] analyzed the relationship between abduc ion and defaults and proposed abduction as an alternative approach to nonmonotonic reason--s ing; Levesque [22] provided a knowledge-level account of abduction highlighting the relation hips with autoepistemic logics; Eshghi & Kowalski [16] noticed the relationship between o d abduction and negation as failure and provided a procedure, based on such a similarity, t etermine answers for logic programs with negation; Jackson [20] proposed a new proposi--p tional logic for abduction; Bylander et al. [3] and Selman & Levesque [34] analyzed the com utational complexity of abduction.
The aim of this paper is at analyzing from various points of view the relationships -1 -between abduction and deduction. The characterization of abductive explanation in terms of " deduction reported above (which is similar to the ones in [10, 16, 27] ) can be regarded as a meta-level" one. In the paper we propose an alternative characterization showing how the e s conclusions of abductive reasoning can be derived deductively at the object level, that is at th ame level of the theory T. Such a characterization allows us to make explicit some of the e c assumptions underlying other definitions of abduction. Moreover, since it is based on predicat ompletion [6] , it shows a relationship between abduction and foundations of logic programming. This paper, which extends previous work discussed in [7, 8] , is organized as follows. In -s section 2, the comparison between "meta-level" and "object-level" abduction (and the relation hip between abduction and deduction) is presented informally using an example. Formal Such implications express cause-effect relationships (the suitability of implication to model -2 -causation is beyond the scope of the paper; see, for example, [38] for a discussion) or, in general, the fact that every "p " can be accepted as a direct explanation for "q". i If we consider the "meta-level" definitions of abduction, the process to determine the explana-: i tions for "q" (i.e. to explain why "q" is present) is based on the following implicit assumption f "q" is present, then at least one of its direct explanations must be present; in particular, in e order for T to explain q, at least one of "p ", "p ", ..., "p " must be assumed, since they are th 1 2 n only direct explanations for "q" in T.
Notice that the second part of the assumption does not mean that knowledge about "q" t m must be complete, but simply that one is reasoning to the best of the given knowledge; i.e. i eans that abduction is a defeasible form of reasoning. Since the assumption above underlies t the meta-level definitions of abduction, an interesting problem is that of looking for a syntactic ransformation of T that makes such an assumption explicit. With such a transformation, in e ( fact, abductive explanations could be determined at the object level, i.e. at the level of th transformed) theory. any implication, are regarded as possible hypotheses ("abducible" atoms, using the terminology orrowed from [15] ) that can be accepted as explanations of observed data. For example, we have two minimal explanations of Ψ ≡ grass is cold and shiny:
These are minimal sets of hypotheses that, in conjunction with T , imply the observation Ψ otice that, with respect to the characterization of explanation given in the introduction, " "interesting" here means primarily "containing only abducible atoms" and secondarily minimal".
The meta-level approach producing E and E as explanations is based on the implicit 1 2 f g assumption discussed above: grass is wet is the only direct explanation o rass is cold and shiny and thus it must be assumed in order to explain it; similarly either t rained last night or sprinkler was on must be assumed in order to explain grass is wet (and hus Ψ ). it is easy to see that T , Ψ == F , i.e. that the formula characterizing the explanations follows deductively from the completed theory and the observations.
The sort of completion used here is the same one suggested in [29] where, however, the possibility of deriving conclusions at the object level is not explored . It is interesting to 1 n o notice that the distinction between "causal" and "evidential" support, introduced in [25] i rder to (partially) mimic in a logical system the behavior of belief propagation in Bayesian : s networks, is not needed since it is implicit in the semantics of the logical connectives prinkler was on supports grass is wet; however this does not support rained last night but only the disjunction rained last night sprinkler was on (which is already believed if \/ S sprinkler was on is believed).
ome comments on the transformation of the theory are worthwhile:
Completing non-abducible predicates corresponds to making explicit the fact that at leas one of the direct explanations of a non-abducible atom "q" must be involved in the explab nation of "q". In other words, in the completed domain theory the explanations that can e obtained from T are represented at the object level, so that the completion allows us 1 . to reduce abduction to deduction A similar transformation has been independently proposed also by Konolige [21] . 1 
-
The fact that abduction is based on a completion semantics does not mean that the -a domain theory must be complete (in the sense that every direct explanation of each non bducible atom must be given in the theory). However, the knowledge base designer s should have in mind that the explanation process can be seen as based on a completion emantics. This means that the explanations obtained through abduction can be misleadr ing if not all relevant knowledge is present in the theory: in particular, either some elevant explanation may be missing or some undesired explanation may be present. e Moreover, this means that if it is known that the theory is incomplete, this should be xplicitly represented: the fact that not all the direct causes (explanations) of an event A A w have been explicitly given can be represented with the addition of a formula α → here α is abducible and represents some unknown or unspecified cause (see [9] for a A discussion on abduction in incomplete causal theories).
bducible atoms are not completed since we are far from giving the complete list of their -known causes (usually we don't give any cause for them, however we do not mean that I they are false, as observed in [29] Notice that E would be a redundant explanation in case "¬oil loss" were omitted from the Head" is intended as "Body directly explains Head"; in fact, the relation "A is involved in a xplanation for B" should naturally result to be a partial order, since it is useless to explain a fact in terms of itself. We shall assume, moreover, that: e (a) the set of predicate symbols in T is partitioned into two disjoint subsets, the abducibl symbols (those that can be accepted as explanations of observed data) and the non-( abducible symbols; b) the abducible symbols are exactly those not occurring in the head of any clause in the theory . 2 Given these basic premises, we can define an abduction problem as follows: otice that Ψ can contain both positive and negative literals and the requirement of Ψ being consistent corresponds to requiring that Ψ does not contain a literal and its negation.
In the following subsections we first present a formal definition of object-level abduction n ( (section 3.1), then we discuss the equivalence between object-level and meta-level abductio section 3.2) and the problem of comparing explanations (section 3.3); finally, in section 3.4
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we present a complete example.
.1 OBJECT-LEVEL CHARACTERIZATION
As we noticed above, the transformation which is needed in order to perform abduction in ead. The conclusions of abductive reasoning (the explanations) can be represented with the notion of "explanation formula" defined as follows:
A complete discussion on the criteria to partition the set of symbols into the subsets of abducible and nona 2 bducible symbols, and, in general, the criteria to define "interesting explanations", is beyond the scope of the pa--t per. We regard this problem as task or domain dependent (see also the discussion in [39] ): a discussion of the cri eria to be adopted in causal diagnostic reasoning can be found in [7, 9] and in [10] ; the criteria to be adopted in the -c planning framework are discussed in [15] while the criteria to be used in natural language interpretation are dis ussed in [39] . C e Definition 2. Let P=<T,Ψ> be an abduction problem and T the completion of non-abducibl predicates in T. The explanation formula for P is the most specific formula F in the language of abducible atoms such that:
where F is more specific than F' iff he explanation formula characterizes all the solutions to an abductive problem. We are -t interested in the most specific formula since it is the one taking into account all the observa ions, i.e. the one having the highest information content among those that can be obtained y p from the observations Ψ. The concept of explanation formula is well defined: it can be easil roved from the definition that if such a most specific formula exists, then it is unique (up to t equivalence); moreover, the following "abstract" procedure and its correctness property show hat such a formula exists.
Procedure ABDUCE.
Rewrite Ψ using the equivalences in T (substituting each non abducible p with the for- otice that this definition coincides with the ones found in the literature when T contains only g n definite clauses and Ψ contains only positive literals. Moreover, we think that considerin egation as failure rather than classical negation is at least as interesting. In fact, abduction can n b be seen as an extension of the computational paradigm of logic programming (assumptions ca e returned as answers to queries [35] ) and therefore it is interesting to introduce the same type of negation used in logic programming.
The following theorem shows a correspondence between m-explanations for P and models T of the explanation formula for P. heorem 2. Let P = <T,Ψ> be an abduction problem having F as the explanation formula.
a Let E be a set of abducible atoms and M an interpretation such that for every abducible tom α M == α iff α ∈ E == F.
P
Then E is an m-explanation iff M roof. Notice that the standard completion of T ∪ E is
where COMP(E) = E ∪ { ¬α / α abducible atom, α ∈ / E } ince SLDNF resolution is sound and complete (with respect to the completion semantics)
for propositional hierarchical programs, we have that
E (see, e.g., [37] ). We thus have that is an m-explanation 
Definition 4.
Given an abduction problem P, each consistent disjunct of any disjunctive nor-I mal form of the explanation formula for P is an explanation for P.
n the following subsection we shall discuss preference criteria for explanations. 
PREFERRED EXPLANATIONS AND CONFIRMED CONCLUSION
Given an abduction problem P, in general P has more than one explanation. An interestt ing problem (that has stimulated many discussions among researchers) is whether it is possible o define some criteria to single out the "preferred explanation" to a problem or to rank alternaa tive explanations. Many researchers suggest that such a problem is just a matter of pragmatics nd that no logical (domain and task independent) criterion can be used to support the choice k (see, for example, the comments in [14, 22, 33] ). In the object-level framework, when no nowledge about abducible atoms is available (as we have assumed in this section), it is -t natural to introduce the criterion of minimal information as a partial criterion to compare solu ions. In other words, we prefer those explanations which involve a minimal set of abducible t literals. For example, the solution "p" is preferred to the solutions "p q" and "p ¬q" since i 
AN EXAMPLE
Let us consider a slight modification of the interpretation problem discussed in section 2 E in order to highlight some of the points discussed above. his may be particularly useful in diagnostic applications to determine the corrections T (repair or therapy) to be applied to the system. he explanation sprinkler was on ¬rained last night is the confirmed explanation, i.e. In the example, this is the case if ¬road is wet is selected first: it succeeds, but a subsequently rained last night may be assumed and ¬road is wet should be tested gain. This and other problems are discussed for example in [36] ; an alternative N approach is to reconduce negation as failure to abduction [16] . otice that in the object level framework positive and negative goals and subgoals are treated uniformly, i.e. no special machinery is needed for negative goals. In case n=1 this can be used to represent "factual" knowledge about abducible atoms ll the discussion in the following can be extended to deal also with such a kind of knowledge. e t 5 In many cases, it could be interesting to have constraints involving also non-abducible atoms. From th heoretical point of view, however, such more general constraints are not needed since one can "compile" a conl c straint involving non-abducible atoms into a constraint involving only abducible atoms. In practice, such genera onstraints could be used to prune the search space as soon as possible.
In such a case one would expect "electrical problems" to be the explanation. Notice that also s Ψ "battery problems" would be an explanation (since it implies "electrical problems" and thu ). However, since there is no specific evidence supporting "battery problems", the more g 4, 1 eneral explanation (i.e. the one which does not make unnecessary assumptions) should be pre-. T ferred. This in fact is the least presumptive explanation according to the definitions in [26] he preference for general explanations is particularly significant when a hypothesis "α" has many subclasses α ,...,α . When no evidence for the subclasses is available, the explanation 
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-Ψ is as in definition 1.
\ \ .
OBJECT-LEVEL CHARACTERIZATION
As we noticed in the examples, given an abduction problem <<T,A,I>,Ψ>, the sets of formulae T, A and I play different roles in the abductive process. In particular:
T is used to generate the explanation formula F, given the observations Ψ to be A and I are used to simplify F according to the criteria discussed above. Our goal is t define some transformation of the explanation formula, according to the knowledge about e abducible atoms contained in A and I, such that the result of the transformation is quivalent, given A ∪ I, to the initial formula. In this way, the result will be a logical consequence of T ∪ A ∪ I ∪ Ψ, which is, in this case, the suitable theory from which C abductive conclusions can be derived deductively (at the object level). Moreover, the A restriction that could be reasonably imposed on A and I is that I should not contain constraints such as, The formula that characterizes the explanations for an abduction problem P is obtaine eductively by means of a three-step process:
Generate the explanation formula F for P using ABDUCE as discussed in section 3.1. In order to extend the result expressed by theorem 2, it is necessary to characterize ho n m-explanation and an interpretation satisfying the formula F can be seen as correspondent.
In particular: * We are only interested in interpretations satisfying I; however, we do not want to make 1) explicit, in the formula characterizing the explanations, all the constraints, including those that are not relevant to the solution of the problem under examination (i.e. we do not want to take F I instead of F ). Therefore we shall consider interpretations satisfying 
EXTENSION TO THE FIRST-ORDER CASE
In this section we discuss how the frameworks presented above can be extended to deal with first-order theories. In particular, we shall consider the case where: the theory T is a first-order hierarchical logic program; (where α are abducible symbols)
the formula Ψ to be explained is a conjunction of (possibly non-ground) literals.
5
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OBJECT-LEVEL CHARACTERIZATION
In order to extend the object-level characterization to the first-order case only some technis cal details have to be modified while the general idea remains unchanged. In particular, it is till possible to characterize the abductive explanations with a formula which is a consequence of the completed theory and the observations.
The price to be paid is that the equality theory included in the completion has to be taken e fi into account. Such an equality theory is needed to express the completed definitions in th rst-order case and contains the usual axioms for equality plus axioms that force syntactically y t different terms to be interpreted as different objects [6, 23] . The introduction of the equalit heory has two main consequences. First of all, the theoretical aspects become more complex. in general, the condition t ≠t must be added to the disjunct. In the particular case where t and t are identical, the disjunct can be removed, since the inequality is unsatisfiable in As regards the correspondence between object and meta-level abduction, a result similar to t t the ones discussed in the previous sections can be proved; in particular the idea is to show tha here is a relationship between the m-explanations and the Herbrand models of the 10 K (and M') should be indexed with the theory T, which is fixed in this proof and has therefore been d 8 ropped in order to simplify the notation.
Notice, however, that for arbitrary theories this might not be sufficient, as shown in [30] . We consider Herbrand models in the language of T,A,I and Ψ, extended to include the Skolem constants t 10 hat can be introduced in the m-explanation.
. 1 A similar observation appears in [30] 
A FINAL EXAMPLE
The following further example illustrates some features of the object-level approach for E first-order theories. ation 2.2 is used to remove ¬ostrich(tweety). Notice that E = {canary(tweety)} is the s e minimal least presumptive m-explanation (also {canary(tweety),bird(tweety)}, which i quivalent to E given A , is least presumptive). We assume that equality is interpreted as the identity relation on the domain of interpretation.
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The result is
¬bird(X) ostrich(X)
\/
Notice that this is a case of floundering in the meta-level definition.
CONCLUSIONS
In the paper we analyzed from different points of view the relationship between abduction 
